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Reeling under the sanctions imposed by the community of nations and heightened internal struggles, the South African white 
government has begun the historic process of dismantling apartheid. The various demncratic forces within the country and their 
aspirations to build a non-racial society still seem disliJnt. Professors Eric Louw and Keyan Tomasellifrom the Centre for Cultural 
and Media Studies III the University of Nata I in Durban describe the turbulent situation in South Africa in vivid detail. 
s. African Politics: Mapping the Constituency 
By P. Eric Louw and Keyan Tomaselli 
President F.W. de Klerk's opening address to Parliament 
on 2 February 1990 radically transfonned South Mrican politics. 
The government unbanned the African National Congress 
(ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC), and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). It lifted the state of emergency which 
had been in place since 1986. In the year that followed, De 
Klerk's National Party (NP) occupied a center-right position, 
while the ANC located itself left of center. 
Ranged against the NP was an alliance which consisted 
of the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions ( 
(COSATU) and the SACP. The United Democratic Front (UDF), 
formed in 1983, was the defacto internal wing of the ANC. This 
coalition advocated a multi-class and multi-ethnic struggle, the 
end-goal of which was to be a non-racial society in which wealth 
would be equitably redistributed. The Front was itself an alliance 
of hundreds of affIliate organizations. The Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM) emerged during 1989 in response to 
government attacks on the UDF and COSATU. First seen on a 
poster, the acronym MDM succinctly encapsulated the popular 
democratic discourse generated within COSATU and the UDF, 
the twin motors of the MDM. The government could not ban the 
MDM because it did not formally exist 
By the end of 1989, the economy was beginning to 
crumble under the costs of the civil war, the debt incurred in the 
military occupation of Namibia and Southern Angola, a crisis 
incurred through overborrowing from overseas banks, and a 
massive flow of capital out of the country. Sanctions were the 
wild card which threatened to trigger a major financial collapse. 
A shift in strategy was required if a semblance of white 
power was to be salvaged. The Cabinet realized that some sortof 
alliance between the NP and the African nationalists within the 
ANC was a more viable option than continued conflict in an 
unwinnable war. The collapse of Soviet power had lessened the 
NP's fear of communism, while events in Eastern Europe forced 
the ANC into a negotiating position, and to abandon the armed 
struggle. 
By the beginning of 1990 the Congress alliance had 
secured the largest constituency in the country. Most analysts 
predicted that South Africa's political future would be ANC-
dominated. Though the NP's public image had dramatically 
improved, the Party had still to shake off the legacy of apartheid'. 
The other players, both within and outside of Parliament, had 
neither the support nor the power of the NP or ANC. However, 
during 1990 the political landscape was radically transformed by 
a most extraordinary shakedown of the contending parties. By 
March 1991, De Klerk's reformed NP was the closest it had ever 
been to securing a workable formula for entrenching its "white" 
constituency in power (albeit in a "multi-racial" guise). In 
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contrast, the Congress alliance, despite the size of its support, had 
failed to organize either itself or its constitnency. The NP thus 
accumulated power by defaull The Party also proved very 
skillful in ouonaneuvering the ANC by ''releasing'' refonn in 
stages and thereby captnring the world's headlines, 
notwithstanding the attention demanded by events in the Gulf. 
The political agenda thus remained under the control of the ruling 
hegemony. The ANC failed to capitalize on issues that the UDF 
and MDM had so effectively used to mobilize their 
constituencies. 
How to integrate theANC, UDF, COSATU, and SACP 
in tenns of organization, strategy, and goals proved difficult in 
the new context heralded by the government's unanticipated shift 
of policy in early 1990. COSATU, in particular, began to 
distance itself from the "politicians." Unionists argued that an 
independent trade labor movement would serve their socialist 
aims more effectively than direct involvement in an ANC-
dominated alliance. Further, UDF activists were often excluded 
from positions reserved for returning exiles in the new ANC 
structure internal to the country. This was an error because it 
marginalized and alienated many UDF activists who had 
extensive experience and success in developing grassroots 
political organization inside the country prior to the ANC's 
return. The fonner exiles lacked the internal constituencies so 
painstakingly developed by UDF organizers after 1983. Not 
surprisingly, the 1,600 delegates (representing grassroots 
sentiment) at the ANC's December 1990 Consultative 
Conference expressed concern that the existing ANC leadership 
was "getting it wrong." 
The ANC is experiencing enonnous difficulties in 
developing mechanisms for communicating with, and organizing 
its potential constituency, and for communicating beyond its 
constituency. A number of factors gave rise to this. First, the 
marginalization of key activists impeded organizational capacity. 
Second, the ANC's constitnency and political structures failed to 
adjust from a liberation struggle to a new style of politics suitable 
for nonnal political interaction. Chanting "Viva Viva" at every 
opportunity is no substitute for basic organizational work and the 
need to actively build support Third, by losing the "image game" 
through a refusal to speak to the political center through tactical 
use of apprnpriate discourse and choice of media, the ANC lost 
much middle ground support. This support had been forged 
during the 1980s to a Congress-position by UDF activists' 
working in the political middle-ground. As a result, the Congress 
was generally outmaneuvered by the NP both locally and 
internationally. 
The ANC had relied heavily upon the Soviet Bloc for 
financial support Once this was tenninated, the Congress 
experienced enonnous problems funding its organizational 
programs. Most seriously, sections of the ANC's constituency are 
beyond control. "Socially psychopathic" groups and individuals 
crossing all races and political positions have been bred by a 
decade of brutal civil war. Black tOwnShip youth, in particular, 
are highly radicalized, alienated from all authority ,1Uld prone to 
extreme political violence. Further, some disruption of the ANC 
by right-wing elements within the military and police who want 
to sabotage reform has consistently undennined peace talks 
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among the warring factions. In other words, the state also lost 
control of sections of its security forces. 
The NP has no choice but to press on with refonns as 
it faces the prospect of defeat in another whites-only election. 
Currently, the government seems to be repeating its previous 
strategy developed with regard to the Namibian Democratic 
Tumhalle Alliance (DTA). This created a multi-racial coalition 
of conservative-centrist parties. The center-right DTA (with 
South African assistance) won considerable support in the 
1989 Namibian elections. The NP apparently hope for a 
similar success in South Africa. The Party's biggest problem 
in 1991 is to entice credible black partners into such an 
alliance. Its most likely allies, such as ChiefButhelezi's 
lnkatha Freedom Party, the "colored" Labor Party and the 
"white"liberal Democratic Party, cannot deliver the huge 
black constituencies De Klerk needs. However, De Klerk has 
several important factors on his side. First is a pool of highly 
skilled political organizers within a functioning national 
network. Second is access to financial resources from the 
business sector (which wants to prevent the ANC from gaining 
power, and which supports De Klerk's pro-"free enterprise" 
position). Fourth is a generally sympathetic press and a totally 
supportive broadcasting network. Fifth, the ANC's 
organizational weakness translates into an NP strength. And 
lastly, because the ANC has lost the political middle-ground, it 
alienated most of the liberal English press, particularly with 
regard to the ANC's early calls for nationalization of certain 
industries, and its refusal to condemn the abduction and 
intimidation of witnesses testifying against Winnie Mandela in 
hertria1. 
The alternative-progressive newspapers like New 
Nation and South, read by black leftists, remain supportive of 
the ANC, but these papers are not read by whites, or non-
leftist blacks or Indians. The social-democrat press, the Weekly 
r---------------i 
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Mail and Vrye Weekb/ad, which have mainly white intellectual 
readerships, however, are becoming increasingly critical of the 
ANC's inability to resolve its internal contradictions, and its 
failure to respond to dynamics ripped open by the government's 
unbanning of the organization. 
Though the NP and ANC are the key political players, 
there are also other contenders. The Pan African Congress (PAC) 
has outflanked the ANC on the left through its radical, somewhat 
Maoist, rhetorical posturing-it accused the ANC of "selling 
out." The PAC originally broke away from the ANC in the early 
1960s because it claimed the ANC was dominated by whites. The 
PAC's policy is to "intensify the struggle," including armed 
struggle. The slogan popuIarized by the PAC's most radical 
(youth) wing is "one settler, one bullet." ("Settler" means 
"white.") The PAC demands a return of "Africa to the Africans" 
(or "Africanism',) and refused to participate in any multi-party 
conference with the NP. Whether or not the PAC has the 
organizational capacity to implement its stated policy of mass 
action has yet to be demonstrated. Lacking a financial resource-
base, with a shortage of skilled political organizers, and no 
media, it seems unlikely that the PAC will be able to translate its 
rhetoric into action. 
The Workers Organization of South Africa (WOSA) is a 
left-wing group comprised mostly of middle class intellectuals in 
Cape Town. WOSA see themselves as "independent socialists." 
They hold that the SACP is unable to articulate a socialist 
position because of"ANC domination," and argue that the ANC 
has been co-opted by NP machinations. WOSA has no intention 
of organizing as a political party to oppose the ANC but acts as a 
smaO vocal left-wing "conscience" for the ANC-SACP-
COSATU alliance. In this role, WOSA seems set to exercise an 
influence out of all proportion to its size. 
BCM combined American Block Power 
principles with tlu Marxism of the Algerian 
Franz Fanon. 
The Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) represents 
the remnants of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). 
Closely. associated with the ideas of Steve Biko, BCM was the 
central intemally-based anti-apartheid force during the 1970s. 
BCM combined American Black Power principles with the 
Marxism of the Algerian Franz Fanon. The basic BCM posiJon 
was that South Africa needed a "black revolution" from which 
whiles would be excluded. However, during the early 1980s 
many BCM cadres were won over to the UDF's "non-racial" 
position. The importance of BCM thus began to fade. Then, at the 
end of the 1980s, many of the remaining BCM cadres joined the 
reviving "Africanist" wing of the PAC. AZAPO is all that 
remains of BCM, its purist position having cut it off from 
possible alliances. For this reason AZAPO is not at present a real 
political force. 
The Inkatha Freedom Party grew out of B uthelezi' s 
political organization based in the Kwa-Zulu bantustan. Buthelezi 
used his position as Chief-Minister of this homeland to build an 
impressive power-base on the back of an economic patronage 
network: the apartheid-based bantustan structures (such as the 
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Kwa-Zulu Education department, police and civil service) were 
staffed with Inkatha supporters. Inkatha represents a Zulu-
nationalist constituency, mostly located in rural Natal. A violent 
conflict which began in the early 1980s raged between Inkatha 
and non-Inkatha based groupings, especially the UDF, COSA TV 
and ANC. This conflict has essentially been a clash between the 
African traditionalism of Inkatha' s constituency on the one hand 
and the modernizing impulses of the ANC's constituency on the 
other. inkatha will playa significant role in the future South 
Africa as a key component in De Klerk's DTA-type center-right 
alliance. 
The far -right consists of a fragmented set of parties 
which split from the NP over the past two decades. The largest of 
these is the Conservative Party (CP), and is the official 
opposition in the whites-only parliament. The CP's policy is to 
return to grand apartheid as formulated by Hendrik Verwoerd in 
the 1950s. The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) (''Reconstituted 
National Party'') represents a more openly, but miniscule, neo-
fascist constituency. The Afrikaner Weerstand Beweeging 
(A WB) ("Afrikaner Resistance Movement"), highly publicized in 
the US media, is a para-military neo-fascist movement It has 
close ties to the the HNP and some links with the CP, and has 
organized armed commandos to fight for "white liberation." 
Although the A WB represents a very small constituency, it is 
likely to become a serious security problem as it has support from 
significant numbers in the state's security forces. Another small 
far-right group is the Boerstaat Party ("Party for a Boer State"). 
This group is campaigning for an Afrikaner homeland to become 
independent from a non-racial South Africa They went so far as 
to buy up a whole town during 1991 and expel all blacks from 
their property. 
The far-right represents a significant factor in "white 
politics." In a whites-only election they would constitute a threat 
to De Klerk. However, within the total framework of South 
African politics they represent a small, underfinanced, beleagured 
minority with little capacity to seriously put apartheid back on the 
agenda. 
The future battle will be between the ANC and NP. Both 
have to push forward with the reform process because neither can 
return to their old positions. De Klerk abandoned significant 
sections of the NP's former white constituency, while the ANC 
has lost its support base from which to wage an armed struggle. 
Both of the main parties are thus forced to make a deal with the 
other. Hence, the shape of South Africa beyond apartheid is 
likely to be a compromise, and even a possible "working 
alliance" between their two agendas. 
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